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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Sean Porter appeals from a final decree of divorce entered by the trial court.
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Mr. Porter presents essentially two issues for review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in distributing property to the
parties?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying alimony to Mr. Porter?
Standard of Review: "Trial courts have considerable discretion in
determining alimony and property distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld
on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated.'"
Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, f 12, 993 P.2d 887 (quoting Howell v.
Howell 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Sean Porter filed for divorce from his wife, Natalie Streeter Porter. After a
trial on November 30 and December 1, 2000, the trial court entered Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law concerning the questions of alimony and division of
property. (R. 449-59, Aple.'s Br. Addendum at 1-10). Thereafter, the court
entered a Decree of Divorce, which denied alimony to Mr. Porter and distributed
various properties to the parties. (R. 461-69, Aplt.'s Br. Addendum at 3-11). Mr.

Porter now appeals from that decree, challenging the trial court's decisions on
alimony and the division of property.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Given the nature of this brief's responses to Mr. Porter's opening brief, no
statement of facts is necessary. For reasons that will become obvious below, the
absence of a statement of facts should not be construed as signifying that Ms.
Streeter1 agrees with Mr. Porter's statement of facts. She does not.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because Mr. Porter's appellate presentation of his case is deficient in several
significant respects, this Court should not address the merits of any of his
arguments. First, Mr. Porter's challenges to the trial court's decision are not
supported by either an adequate record on appeal or proper citations to the record
- clear violations of basic rules of appellate procedure.
Second, Mr. Porter has not complied with the well-established "marshaling
requirement" in attacking the trial court's findings. Rather, he argues only those
"facts" that are favorable to his position - something this Court has repeatedly
condemned.

The divorce decree restored to appellee the use of her maiden name: Natalie T.
Streeter. Accordingly, this brief refers to her as "Ms. Streeter."
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B.

This Court should not consider Mr. Porter's challenges to the trial
court's judgment because his appellate arguments are not supported by
an adequate record or proper citations to the record.
As foundation for Mr. Porter's claims that the trial court erred in denying

him alimony and in dividing property between the parties, he sets forth in his brief
an extensive "Statement of Facts," which is supported only by occasional
references to various trial exhibits. Aplt.'s Br. 3-9. Many of those exhibits,
however, do not support the factual assertions to which their citation is attached.
Moreover, the majority of Mr. Porter's "facts" are not supported by any citation to
the record. Noticeably absent are any citations to a transcript of the two-day trial,
which Mr. Porter has not provided for this Court's review (having not had one
prepared). The same is true with respect to the assertions of "fact" and references
to "testimony" that appear in the "Discussion" section of Mr. Porter's brief.
Aplt.'s Br. 15-26.
It is well settled that an appellant who attacks the findings of the trial court,
as Mr. Porter does here, must (1) "provide this [CJourt with all evidence relevant to
the issues raised on appeal,'" Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), and (2) must "make a 'concise statement of [relevant] facts and
citation of the pages in the record where those facts are supported." Phillips v.
Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Koulis v. Standard
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C.

Mr. Porter's failure to comply with the "marshaling requirement" is an
additional basis upon which this Court should not consider his attacks
on the trial court's judgment.
Although Mr. Porter never cites any of the findings the trial court made with

respect to alimony and the division of property, see Decree of Divorce (R. 461-69,
Aplt.'s Br. Addendum at 3-11) and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law (R. 44959, Aple.'s Br. Addendum at 1-10), his arguments for reversal necessarily attack
those findings. In that regard, he fails to summarize the evidence that supports
those findings or to demonstrate the insufficiency of that evidence, as he is
obligated to do under the well-established "marshaling requirement."
As this Court has stated on numerous occasions:
On appeal, it is the burden of the party seeking to overturn the trial
court's decision to "marshal the evidence in support of the findings
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of
the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'"
Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted).
Indeed, "[t]he marshaling requirement is a prerequisite to [this Court's]
examination of the finding[s]." Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, f 29,

P.2d

. And, "[i]f the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court
assumes the record supports the finding[s] of the trial court." Ibid, (internal
quotation marks omitted; second brackets in original).
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Mr. Porter does not even pretend to satisfy the marshaling requirement. He
simply presents only those "facts" that support his side of the argument,
completely avoiding his obligation to "present, in comprehensive and fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the
very findings [he] resists" and then, "[a]fter constructing this magnificent array of
supporting evidence, * * * [to] ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." West Valley
City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (explaining
marshaling requirement). Accordingly, this Court should assume the trial court's
findings are supported by the evidence and affirm its decisions concerning alimony
and property division.
D.

Mr. Porter's failure to provide adequate briefing provides yet another
basis on which this Court should decline to address his assignments of
error.
In the "Discussion" section of his brief, Mr. Porter - for all practical

purposes - presents no cogent legal analysis to support his claims of error. It is
well settled that "[b]riefs must contain reasoned analysis based upon relevant
authority." Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, <j[ 8, 995 P.2d 14 (citing Utah R.
App. P. 24). "An issue is inadequately briefed when 'the overall analysis of the
issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing
court.'" Ibid, (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)). All of
the arguments contained in Mr. Porter's "Discussion" suffer from that defect.
7

There is no effort to apply - in any structured or understandable way - the relevant
legal principles to the facts or, more importantly, to direct this Court to the specific
findings by the trial court that Mr. Porter contends are wrong and demonstrate how
the court abused its discretion. Therefore, an additional ground for this Court's
affirmance of the trial court's judgment without reaching the merits of Mr. Porter's
appellate arguments is that his briefing is wholly inadequate. See Smith, 1999 UT
App 370,117 ("Because of the inadequacy of Appellant's brief, we affirm the
judgment below.").
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should summarily affirm the
trial court's judgment.
DATED this ^ ? % a y of October 2001.
Respectfully submitted,

c

^6<^3^
DAVID B. THOMPSON
CHRISTINA I. MILLER
Counsel for Appellant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEAN PORTER,
Petitioner,

)1
>
]

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

j

V.

NATALIE STREETER PORTER,
Respondent.

i
]
1
'

Civil No. 994600017
Judge L. A. Dever

This matter came on for trial before the Honorable L.A. Dever, on November 30, 2000
and December 1,2000. Petitioner was present and was represented by counsel, Franklin Richard
Brussow. Respondent was present and was represented by counsel, Christina Inge Miller and
Jeffery D. Salberg. The Court, having heard the testimony provided by the parties and other

witnesses, having heard the proffers of counsel, having reviewed the pleadings on file herein,
and being fully informed, hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner and respondent are bona fide and actual residents of Summit County,

State of Utah, and have been for a period in excess of three months prior to the commencement
of this action.
2.

Petitioner and respondent are husband and wife, respectively, having been

married on October 12, 1996.
3.

The parties have experienced difficulties in their relationship, which have become

and are irreconcilable and which make the continuation of the marriage under the circumstances
impossible.
4.

There have been no children born issue of this marriage, and none are expected.

5.

Respondent should be restored the use of her maiden name, to wit: Streeter.
ALIMONY

6.

Petitioner has not established a need for alimony. His financial condition as of

February 1999, the end of the parties' relationship, was better than it had been prior to the marriage.
When petitioner received a substantial gift from respondent's parents in the Spring of 1999, instead
of paying bills, petitioner gave approximately $10,000 to his sister and mother. His income after
separation was greater than that before or during the marriage. Petitioner claims he left his
employment because of the stress of the divorce rather than being fired. There is no corroboration
of this claim. In fact, petitioner's testimony was that he had been fired from a job prior to the

lcs l:\Streeter\Findings & Conclusions

marriage. Petitioner also testified that he has not seriously looked for a job and has been waiting for
the divorce to become final. Petitioner is a professional and is capable of earning a good income.
Petitioner has no extraordinary expenses and is living the same as he did prior to moving in with
respondent. Presently respondent has no income other than income received from her trust.
Petitioner's claim that respondent should get a job and pay him alimony is without merit. The length
of the marriage was approximately four years total. Accordingly, petitioner's claim for alimony
should be denied.
DIVISION OF PROPERTY
Petitioner, under oath, stated, and his counsel later stipulated, that petitioner is entitled to
one-half of the appreciation of the properties in question. Petitioner stated, and his counsel later
stipulated, that respondent is entitled to be reimbursed for any trust monies not commingled.
Respondent's Pre-Marital Property
7.

Empire Avenue Property: The Empire Avenue property is a pre-marital,

separate asset of respondent. The appraised value of the property prior to the marriage was
$310,000. As of the date of trial, the property is valued at $268,000. The property has not
appreciated in value. Petitioner has made no payments on the house, except three payments to a
later mortgage secured by the house, and has made only minor repairs while living in the house.
The taxes have always been paid by respondent's trust funds. Accordingly, petitioner's claim for
any interest in the Empire Avenue property should be denied and the Empire Avenue property,
together with any indebtedness, should be awarded to respondent as her sole and separate
property.

8.

6.18 Acres and 5 Water Shares: The 6.18 acres and 5 water shares is a pre-

marital, separate asset of respondent. The appraised value of the property in 1994 was $365,000.
In the year 2000, the appraised value of the property is $435,000. The property was purchased
with respondent's trust funds. All taxes were paid by respondent. Some improvements were
made to the house and the barn (i.e., new roof, new floors, new bath, new paint) and all materials
were paid by respondent. Petitioner, along with respondent and others, were involved with some
labor aspects of some improvements. However, there has been no evidence as to the value
(enhancement) of the material or the labor involved on this property. Accordingly, petitioner's
claim for an interest in this property should be denied and the 6.18 acres and 5 accompanying
water shares, together with any indebtedness, should be awarded to respondent as her sole and
separate property.
9.

Overhang Property: During the marriage, respondent acquired shares in a

family vacation home in Isle Au Haut, Maine. Petitioner stated under oath that he was given
$3,333.34 by respondent's father to purchase shares and to give those shares to respondent.
Petitioner stated that he complied with this request from Mr. Streeter by depositing the gift and
providing the money to respondent. Petitioner has no interest in those shares or any viable claim
for an interest therein. Accordingly, petitioner's claim for an interest in the Overhang Property
should be denied and any interest in the Overhand Property, together with any indebtedness,
should be awarded to respondent as her sole and separate property.
10.

4.77 Acres and 4Vi Water Shares: The 4.77 acres and 4V2 water shares is a pre-

marital, separate asset of respondent. The property was purchased in 1996 for $210,883. The

lcs l:\Streeter\Findings & Conclusions

value at the time of trial is $170,000. The property has not appreciated in value. The property
was purchased by refinancing of the Empire Avenue home. The taxes have been paid by
respondent. Petitioner stated that the only work he did on this property was to fix the fence and
clean the property. He also stated that he made three payments on the mortgage on this property
of $1,668.55 each, plus additional assessments. The issue of petitioner's payments is addressed
in paragraph 21 below. Accordingly, petitioner's claim for an interest in this property should be
denied and the 4.77 acres and 414 accompanying water shares, together with any indebtedness,
should be awarded to respondent as her sole and separate property.
11.

19.03 Acres - Allegheny Property: The 19.03 acres of Allegheny property is a

pre-marital, separate asset of respondent. The property was purchased by respondent in July
1996 with her trust funds for $66,000. Petitioner stated that the purpose behind the purchase of
this property was to sell the lumber and to split the profits. Respondent has not disputed this
claim. The parties received $65,500 for the timber on the property. Therefore, all of the funds
expended by respondent for the purchase of this property have been returned. Accordingly, this
property should be immediately listed for sale and sold and the proceeds derived therefrom, after
paying all expenses, should be split equally between the parties.
12.

37.82 Acres and 38 Water Shares: The 37.82 acres and 38 water shares are a

pre-marital, separate asset of respondent. The down payment was paid by respondent's trust
funds and profit from Deer Valley property, which was purchased by the parties. The Deer
Valley property was a $240,000 investment, $211,000 from respondent's trust funds and $29,000
from petitioner in the form of a twelve percent (12%) discount from the seller. There is a
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disagreement as to the percentage of ownership in the Deer Valley property as a result of this
investment procedure. Petitioner claims 50/50 and respondent claims 60/40. However, the
property was titled jointly and will therefore be considered a 50/50 relationship. Petitioner is
requesting one-half of the appreciated value of this property. The property was purchased for
$960,000 in February of 1996 and has a present value of $900,000. There has been no
appreciation. Petitioner's claim for an interest in this property should be denied. Furthermore,
since petitioner's claim is only for one-half of the appreciation, the property should be awarded
to respondent as her sole and separate property, subject to its indebtedness.
Post-Marital Property
13.

100 Acres, Boulder, Utah: The Boulder property was purchased in December

1996. Respondent stated that she felt obligated to put the property in joint tenancy because she
was put on the spot at the closing and she determined that because she did not have a Will, joint
tenancy would keep the property out of probate. The property was purchased for $750,000.
Respondent put $200,000 down from her trust funds and has paid four payments of $62,765 from
her trust funds on a 20-year note. Petitioner has paid $500 for crop spraying and may have paid
$625 for part of the hay. Neither of these payments has enhanced the value of the land.
Petitioner stated that he graded a road. The testimony of Mr. Muse was that the type of grading
done by petitioner only lasts for approximately 4 months due to the nature of the soil. The
current value of the land does not exceed the payments made and the remaining mortgage.
Respondent has paid all of the taxes from her trust funds. Accordingly, petitioner's claim for an

lcs l:\Streeter\Findings & Conclusions
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interest in the Boulder property should be denied and the Boulder property should be awarded to
respondent as her sole and separate property, subject to the outstanding indebtedness.
14.

Silver Springs, Nevada: Respondent purchased the Silver Springs, Nevada

property for $30,186 in June of 1997. Respondent purchased the property with her trust funds.
Petitioner testified that the purchase of the house was a business deal between respondent and his
father. Petitioner made no claims that he was involved in said business deal. Respondent has
paid all of the taxes from her trust funds. Petitioner has admitted that he has done nothing to
enhance the value of the property. Accordingly, petitioner's claim for an interest in the Silver
Springs property should be denied and the property, together with any indebtedness, should be
awarded to respondent as her sole and separate property.
15.

1 Share of Midway Irrigation Water: Respondent purchased the water share

with her trust funds. Petitioner testified that he had no knowledge of the purchase and has made
no claim on it. Accordingly, petitioner's claim for an interest in the 1 share of Midway Irrigation
should be denied and the 1 share should be awarded to respondent as her sole and separate
property.
16.

4 Shares of Midway Irrigation Water: The parties purchased 4 shares of

Midway Irrigation water for $15,000 per share in 1998. The present value is still $15,000 per
share. Each party paid $6,000 as a down payment. Respondent has made the first of six annual
payments of $10,700 from her trust funds. It is appropriate that respondent be ordered to pay to
petitioner the amount of $6,000 representing his down payment for the water shares. Upon

lcs l:\Streeter\Findings & Conclusions
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payment of the $6,000 to petitioner, the water shares should be awarded to respondent, as her
sole and separate property, with no claim by petitioner.
17.

Midway Equestrian Center: The parties formed a partnership known as the

Midway Equestrian Center. Much of the labor that was done on all the property was to benefit
this partnership; however, Midway Equestrian Center does not own the real property. Midway
Equestrian Center does have personal property valued at approximately $22,000, plus a backhoe
valued at $36,020. Respondent has incurred debt and expenses in the approximate amount of
$250,000 against the partnership. Accordingly, it is appropriate that the Midway Equestrian
Center business, together with its indebtedness, be awarded to respondent as her sole and
separate property, free and clear of any claim by petitioner.
Miscellaneous Provisions:
18.

Timp's Shadow. Timp's Shadow was an asset of the Midway Equestrian

Center and its value was consumed by that partnership.
19.

Backhoe. The backhoe residual was paid off by petitioner with funds received

from respondent's mother, which were sent, at respondent's request, for the purpose of paying
off the backhoe. The backhoe has been included in the value of the partnership and should
therefore be awarded to respondent as her sole and separate property. Accordingly, petitioner's
claim for an interest in the backhoe should be denied.
20.

Dodge Truck: The Dodge Truck was a leased vehicle. Respondent made all of

the monthly payments with her trust funds. The residual was paid off by respondent with her
trust funds in October 2000. Accordingly, petitioner's claim for an interest in the Dodge Truck

lcs l:\Streeter\Findings & Conclusions
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should be denied and the Dodge Truck should be awarded to respondent as her sole and separate
property, together with any indebtedness.
21.

Refinance: Respondent had to pay $5,409 in fees because of petitioner's failure

to cooperate in the refinance of the 37.82 acres. Petitioner, therefore, owes respondent $5,409.
However, petitioner should receive credit for the mortgages and assessments he paid on the
Empire mortgage as set forth in paragraph 10 above. Accordingly, respondent should pay to
petitioner the sum of $296.
22.

Income Tax Refund: Respondent should be directed to have her accountant

calculate each party's 1998 tax refund/obligation for filing separate 1998 tax returns. If
respondent is entitled to a larger refund because she filed a joint return with petitioner,
respondent should be ordered to pay to petitioner one-half of the difference of the refund she will
receive by filing the joint return versus the refund she would receive by filing a separate return.
The parties should be ordered to immediately execute the 1999 joint income tax returns
as soon as the same are available.
23.

Attorneys Fees: Each party is capable of paying their own attorney's fees and

costs incurred herein and should be ordered to pay the same.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In accordance with the aforementioned Findings of Fact, the Court has reached the
following Conclusions of Law:
1.

This Court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction over this case and the parties

to this case. Venue is properly in this Court.

9

2.

Petitioner is entitled to a divorce based on the grounds that irreconcilable differences

have arisen during the course of the marriage, making its continuation impossible.
3.

It is reasonable and proper that the parties' assets, debts and liabilities be

distributed in accordance with the above Findings of Fact.
4.

It is reasonable and proper for a Decree of Divorce to be issued that is consistent

with the Findings of Fact in all regards.
DATED this ^ _ _ day of January, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

Third Distric
STAMP USE5^^R£CT1^Q(P JUDGE
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NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 4-504 OF THE RULES OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
To the Petitioner, SEAN PORTER, and his counsel, FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial
Administration of the District Courts of the State of Utah, that these Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law prepared by respondent shall be the Order of the Court unless you file an
objection in writing within five (5) days from the date of the service of this notice.
DATED this

'i{

day of January, 2001.
TESCH? V.

Christina Inge Miller
Attorneys for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

I day of January, 2001,1 mailed, via U.S. Mail, postage

prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing to:
Franklin Richard Brussow
P.O. Box 71705
Salt Lake City, Utah 84171

n

